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Single‑mother poverty: how 
much do educational differences 
in single motherhood matter?
Juho Härkönen1
Educational differences in family structure have received increasing 
attention in family demographic research ever since McLanahan (2004) 
coined the term ‘diverging destinies’ to describe educationally uneven 
trends in family formation and family structure, parental involvement 
and families’ attachment to the labour market. Her key finding was that 
highly educated women have been forming their families later in life 
and leading family lives characterised by stable marriage, high labour-
force participation and husbands actively involved in childrearing, 
whereas less educated women’s family lives have become characterised 
by less marriage, more single motherhood and less father involvement. 
This combination of trends has increased educational disparities in 
family life, with the potential to increase inequalities in adults’ and 
children’s wellbeing and future life chances (McLanahan & Percheski, 
2008; Putnam, 2015).
In this chapter, I focus on one aspect of such inequality: poverty rates 
in single-mother households, and the difference in poverty between 
single-mother and coupled-parent households (the single-mother 
poverty gap), from a cross-national viewpoint. The educational 
disparities in the prevalence of single motherhood mean that single 
mothers have, on average, lower levels of education than partnered 
mothers. This combination of low education and single parenthood 
often leads to very high poverty risks (Härkönen, 2017) and can, at 
the aggregate level, translate into larger single-mother poverty gaps 
than in the absence of these educational differences. Yet, both the 
educational gradients of single motherhood and educational differences 
in poverty levels can vary cross-nationally, meaning that the importance 
of educational differences in single motherhood for the single-mother 
poverty gap is likely to vary as well.
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The remaining chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, I 
provide an overview of the educational differences in family structures. 
I then describe the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database that I 
use. In the results section, I describe the educational gradients in single 
motherhood in the 2010s and the poverty rates among single and 
partnered mothers with different educational levels. I then proceed to 
analyse what the single-mother poverty gap would be in the absence 
of educational gradients of single motherhood, to give an account of 
how much these demographic differences matter for single-mother 
poverty. The last section concludes.
Education and single motherhood cross‑nationally
McLanahan’s (2004) seminal article focused on the US, even though 
she presented comparative findings from Canada and European 
societies as well. A key finding in her article was that trends in 
US single motherhood – defined in that study as mothers who are 
not married or living with their husbands – have been increasingly 
differentiated by education (McLanahan 2004, pp 611–612). Low-
educated US mothers were more likely than middle- or high-
educated mothers to be single already in the 1960s, but this gap has 
grown even bigger since. From 1960 till 2000, the prevalence of 
single motherhood remained relatively stable among highly educated 
women (below 10%), but increased among both the medium educated 
(from below 10% to close to 30%) and especially the low educated 
(from around 15% to above 40%). Later studies have complemented 
these figures by showing how the gap in US single motherhood 
prevalence between the highest and lowest educational groups has 
remained, while single motherhood prevalence has increased among 
mothers with middle educational levels, approaching the figures of 
the low educated (Manning & Brown, 2014; McLanahan & Jacobsen, 
2015).
Comparisons with other countries show both similarities and 
differences to the trends in the US. First, several countries have negative 
educational gradients of single motherhood, meaning that single 
motherhood prevalence decreases when moving up the educational 
distribution. Compared to the US, the educational differences in single 
motherhood prevalence are as large or even larger in the UK and 
Ireland, and clear also in the Nordic countries, many countries of 
Continental and Eastern Europe, as well as East Asia (even though 




Second, despite these similarities between the US and many other 
countries, the negative educational gradient of single motherhood is by 
no means universal. It is small or nonexistent in Southern Europe and 
Switzerland, but also in Russia, where single motherhood is otherwise 
common (Härkönen, 2017).
Third, the trends in the educational differences in single motherhood 
have not been in unison. In many European countries, educational 
differences in single motherhood were small until the 1980s or later, 
but subsequently began to widen. Since then, single motherhood 
prevalence has increased among middle-educated and, in particular, 
low-educated women in the Nordic countries, the UK, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (Härkönen, 
2017). For example, the probability that a Swedish child spent time 
in a single-mother family during her childhood increased from 20% 
to 30% from the 1970s to the 1990s for children of low-educated 
mothers, but remained at around 20% for children of highly educated 
mothers (Kennedy & Thomson, 2010; Thomson & Eriksson, 2013). 
Broadening the scope outside North America, Europe and East Asia, 
the trends in many Latin American countries have been the opposite: 
highly educated mothers are today more likely to be single, in contrast 
to the situation just some decades ago (Boertien, 2015).
These patterns and trends are found in a large number of countries 
representing different welfare regime arrangements, as well as patterns 
of educational inequality in other outcomes. Yet, they are closely 
aligned with changes in the educational gradients of divorce and 
family dissolution. Single motherhood incidence depends on the 
non-partnered childbearing rate and the dissolution rate of families 
with children (Heuveline et  al., 2003) – and, in more rare cases, 
widowhood. Of these, family dissolution is the more common pathway 
to single motherhood (Andersson et al., 2017), and the educational 
differences in single motherhood incidence are thus likely to be driven 
by educational differences in family dissolution (single motherhood 
prevalence is additionally affected by single mothers’ re-partnering rate 
and children moving out).
Non-partnered parenthood is educationally patterned, and low-
educated women are more likely to bear children outside partnership 
(Jalovaara & Fasang, 2015; Perelli-Harris et al., 2010). The available 
evidence does not suggest major shifts in this association (Perelli-Harris 
et  al., 2010). Early childbearing, which is closely related to non-
partnered parenthood and later family dissolution, also has a clear 
negative educational gradient, which has furthermore increased over 
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time in many countries (Raymo et al., 2015). There has been an 
evident change in the relationship between (female) education and 
divorce and union dissolution in several societies, with many European 
societies and Japan seeing a reversal in the association from a positive to 
a negative one during the last decades (Chan & Halpin, 2005; De Graaf 
& Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Hoem, 1997; Raymo 
& Iwasawa, 2017). Although we lack a comprehensive understanding 
of the reasons behind these developments, the educational gradient of 
divorce tends to be more negative in countries and at times when the 
family patterns overall are less tightly formed around stable marriages 
(Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Matysiak et al., 2014), and they have 
been more negative in societies with less generous welfare states 
(Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006).
Do educational differences in single motherhood increase 
inequality?
The widening educational gaps in single motherhood have led 
to widespread concerns of its implications for social inequality 
(McLanahan, 2004; McLanahan & Percheski, 2008; Putnam, 2015). 
Single mothers and their children face elevated poverty and other 
wellbeing risks, and growing up in a single-mother family can lead to 
lower educational attainment and psychological wellbeing in adulthood 
(Amato, 2000; Bradshaw et al., 2012; Maldonado & Nieuwenhuis, 
2015; McLanahan & Sandefur, 1994). Poverty risks and other adverse 
outcomes can be particularly prominent among single mothers with 
low education. These mothers are often doubly disadvantaged in the 
labour market, as their employment situation is restricted by not only 
their low education but also the challenges of combining paid work 
with family responsibilities (for example, Härkönen et  al., 2016). 
Low education and a weak employment situation combined with 
inadequate policies can create the ‘triple bind’ that hampers single-
mother households’ wellbeing and that is central to this book (Chapter 
One by Nieuwenhuis and Maldonado, in this book).
Despite the intuitive appeal of the argument that the widening 
educational gradients in single motherhood increase inequality, there 
are surprisingly few empirical assessments of it. Together with Eevi 
Lappalainen and Marika Jalovaara (2016), I found that the increasingly 
negative gradient of single motherhood contributed to Finnish 
single mothers’ employment rates lagging behind those of partnered 
mothers. This effect was amplified by low-educated single mothers’ 
increasing difficulties in the labour market. In another paper, Bernardi 
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and Boertien (2016) found that educational differences in single 
motherhood did not widen inequalities in educational attainment by 
mother’s educational background, partly because of the higher single-
motherhood penalty among children of highly educated mothers. 
Finally, in a paper related to this study, I found that negative educational 
gradients in single motherhood can strengthen differences in child 
poverty by maternal education, but this was contingent on the size 
of the single-mother poverty gap (Härkönen, 2017). What mattered 
was not only how many more children of low-educated mothers lived 
in a single-mother household because single motherhood prevalence 
was higher in this educational group. What additionally mattered was 
how much higher these children’s poverty risks were because they 
lived with a single parent, instead of two parents; if children of single 
and partnered mothers had the same poverty risks, it would not matter 
which household type they lived in.
These empirical analyses underline the more general fact that the 
implications of ‘diverging destinies’ for social inequality depend on 
not only how wide the gaps in family demography are but also the 
strength of its effects (cf. Cohen, 2015). The policy implication of this 
is that instead of trying to steer family demographic behaviours, which 
is difficult, one can try to reduce the effects of family structure and 
family dynamics on adults’ and children’s wellbeing and life chances.
To my knowledge, even though many studies on family structure 
and poverty or other wellbeing outcomes control for educational 
attainment, no study has hitherto focused on how much educational 
gradients in single motherhood contribute to the single-mother 
poverty gap. I analyse 15 European and North American countries 
that align with well-known welfare state regime categories (for 
example, Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Korpi, 2000). Denmark, 
Finland and Norway represent the Nordic countries; France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands the Continental ones; Australia, 
Canada, Ireland, the UK and the US the Liberal regime; and Greece, 
Italy and Spain represent Southern Europe.
The countries differ along two dimensions relevant for this study: 
1) the prevalence of single motherhood and its educational gradient, 
and 2) the overall poverty rate, especially that among single mothers. 
As discussed earlier (cf. Härkönen, 2017), educational gradients in 
single motherhood have been prominently documented, particularly 
in the US but also in the other countries belonging to the Liberal 
regime. They are also found in the Nordic and Continental countries. 
Education and single motherhood are, hitherto, the least associated 
in Southern Europe, although recent findings indicate signs of an 
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opening up of a negative educational gradient in single motherhood 
and family dissolution also in (parts of) Italy and in Spain (Garriga 
et al., 2015; Härkönen, 2017; Salvini & Vignoli, 2011). Accordingly, 
one would expect that the educational gradient of single motherhood 
has the largest effect on single-mother household poverty and the 
single-mother poverty gap in the countries with the largest educational 
gradients, and the smallest effects in Southern Europe where the 
gradients are the weakest, or non-existing.
Single mothers’ poverty rates likewise differ between these countries 
(for example, Bradshaw et  al., 2012; Brady & Burroway, 2012; 
Maldonado & Nieuwenhuis, 2015). Although not completely stable 
over time, single-mother poverty has generally been the lowest in the 
Nordic countries, which have been characterised by generous and 
universal welfare policies and support for single mothers’ employment, 
and higher in countries in which public support for single parents has 
been lower. Likewise, the single-mother poverty gap shows major 
cross-national variation. Would single mothers’ poverty rates, and 
the single-mother poverty gap, be much smaller without educational 
differences in single motherhood?
Data, variables and method
I used data for the 15 countries from the LIS database from the period 
2010–14. Analysis was restricted to this period so as to include the 
most up-to-date data for a large range of countries. From the regimes 
covered in this chapter, Austria, Belgium, Sweden and Switzerland 
did not provide LIS data for this period. Otherwise, I used all the 
existing data available for this time period. For most countries, this 
meant that I used data from two LIS waves (usually collected in 2010 
and 2013), which I combined into one file. The benefit of this was 
an increase in cell sizes.
The variables used in the analysis are education, single motherhood 
and poverty. Education was measured using the three-category 
LIS education variable, which distinguishes between low (less than 
secondary), middle (secondary) and high (tertiary) education. Because 
educational systems and educational distributions differ markedly 
between the analysed countries, there was no perfect solution 
available for classifying educational levels. The share of mothers 
with low education according to this variable is just 10% or less in 
Canada, Finland, the UK and the US. One could feasibly argue that 
with educational expansion, the meaning of having low education 
has changed. However, alternative classifications posed their own 
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problems, partly due to substantive issues (defining low education 
to include secondary education would have covered the majority of 
Southern European mothers) and differences in coding of the more 
detailed education variables between countries and waves. Likewise, 
constructions of relative educational measures (setting upper and lower 
thresholds in each country’s educational distributions, cf. McLanahan 
2004) are no panacea. Ranking specific educational levels is often 
not obvious, specifically in educational systems with parallel tracks 
(Germany being the most famous example). Furthermore, some 
educational groups can be very large, covering up to half of the 
population or more, which means that the size of relative educational 
groups varies widely between the countries. The potential limitations 
of the solution used here should nevertheless be kept in mind, and 
future studies using data from single countries would do well to use 
nationally validated educational measures.
Single-mother households were identified as households of non-
widowed women who co-reside with their own minor (0–17 years) 
children and do not have a partner residing in the same household 
(although they may reside with other adults, such as their own 
parents). Coupled-parent households were defined as households 
of otherwise similar mothers, who co-reside with a partner (who 
can be the husband or cohabiting partner, and possibly the father of 
her children). Poverty was defined as incomes falling below 60% 
of the national median of equivalence-scaled disposable household 
incomes, using the square root of household size as the equivalence 
scale. Individual-level sample weights were used when estimating 
the prevalence of single motherhood, and household sample weights 
multiplied by the household size were used when estimating poverty 
rates.
I used simple demographic standardisations to recalculate 
counterfactual poverty rates in single-mother and coupled-partner 
households in the hypothetical absence of educational differences in 
single motherhood, holding the poverty rates in each education–family 
structure cell constant (for example, Das Gupta, 1993). In practice, I 
used the educational distribution of all mothers as the standard; if no 
educational group has a higher prevalence of single motherhood than 
any other, then single and partnered mothers would have the same 
educational distribution – that is, that of all mothers. An implication of 
this is that in countries with a negative educational gradient of single 
motherhood, not only would single mothers have a higher average 
level of education under this counterfactual scenario but partnered 
mothers would also have a lower average educational level. Though 
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crude, this standardisation exercise provides a general idea of how 
much educational gradients in single motherhood matter for the 
single-mother poverty gap.
I performed two sets of standardisations. In the first set, I estimated 
standardised poverty rates for each country, using that country’s 
poverty rates and mothers’ educational distributions as the input. These 
tell what the poverty rates would be in the absence of educational 
differences in single-motherhood prevalence. In the second set of 
standardisations I used each country’s educational distributions, 
but Dutch poverty rates as input. This standardisation was done to 
illustrate that the level of poverty matters for how much educational 
differences in single motherhood affect single-mother poverty rates, 
and is explained in more detail in the results section.
Results
Educational differences in single-mother prevalence
Figure  2.1 presents the prevalence of single motherhood by the 
mother’s educational level in each country. The overall prevalence of 
single motherhood varies greatly between the countries. It is the least 
common in Italy and Greece (around 5–10%), and most common in 
Ireland, the UK and the US (20–25%); the Nordic and Continental 
countries, as well as Canada and Australia, fall in between.
The countries also differ with regard to the educational differences 
in single motherhood. There are almost no educational differences 
in single motherhood prevalence in Italy and Greece, and a weak 
negative educational gradient in Spain. In the other countries, less-
educated mothers are clearly more likely to be single than better-
educated mothers, and single-mother prevalence among the low 
educated is between two and three times as high as among the highly 
educated. Mothers with middle education are found in between. The 
educational gradients are the starkest in Australia, Ireland, the UK and 
Luxembourg, where single-mother prevalence is up to three times 
higher among low-educated than high-educated mothers. In Ireland, 
around 40% of low-educated mothers are single. In the US, single 
motherhood is almost as common among the middle educated as 
it is among the low educated, which corresponds to earlier findings 
showing that college-educated American women are pulling apart 
from the rest by sticking to ‘traditional’ family behaviours (Härkönen, 
2017; Manning & Brown, 2014; McLanahan & Jacobsen, 2015). 
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national differences in highly educated women’s single-motherhood 
prevalence. In most countries, around 10–15% of highly educated 
mothers are single (and less than that in Luxembourg and Southern 
Europe). There is much more cross-national variation in single 
motherhood among the middle and (particularly) the low educated.
Most of the countries presented here have clearly negative 
educational gradients of single motherhood. It is likely that the 
single-mother poverty gap in these countries is larger than it would be 
without these educational differences. Yet how wide these educational 
differences are varies cross-nationally, from almost none (Greece and 
Italy) to clearly negative (for example, Ireland), suggesting that the 
contribution of these differences to the single-mother poverty gap 
is also likely to vary. Next, I look into poverty rates among single-
mother and coupled-parent families in the different educational groups 
and cross-nationally. Finally, I estimate how different poverty rates in 
single-mother and coupled-parent households would be if educational 
differences in single motherhood were eradicated.
Education, single motherhood and poverty
It is well known that single-mother households have higher poverty 
rates than coupled-parent households, and the results reported in 
Table 2.1 confirm this pattern for each of the 15 countries. Yet, both 
the single-mother household poverty rate and the single-mother 
poverty gap vary cross-nationally (Maldonado & Nieuwenhuis, 
2015). Single-mother households are the least likely to be poor in 
Denmark, Finland, France and the Netherlands (<30%), and have the 
highest poverty rates in Australia, Canada, Italy and the US (40–50%). 
Likewise, the difference in poverty rates between single-mother and 
coupled-parent households varies from around 20 percentage points 
in Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, the 
UK and Spain, to 35 percentage points in Australia. Worth noting 
is that the variation in the single-mother poverty gap results from 
cross-national variation in the poverty rates of both single-mother and 
coupled-parent households.
One obtains a more refined picture of poverty in the two household 
types when examining them by the mother’s educational attainment 
levels. It is hardly a surprise that low-educated single-mother 
households have high poverty risks. Nevertheless, the extremely high 
poverty rates in these households are striking: with the exception of 
the Netherlands, they range between 40% and 75% in each country, 
being the highest (>70%) in Canada and the US but hovering around 
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50% even in the Nordic countries, which are generally known for 
their low single-mother poverty rates. Although single-mother 
households are more likely to be poor at each educational level, the 
single-mother poverty gap is generally larger the lower the mother’s 
level of education. Single motherhood thus affects poverty most for 
low-educated mothers, who are generally in the economically most 














Low 52 14 47 24 55 13
Middle 25  5 31  9 34  5
High 11  2 13  3 18  3














Low 57 19 73 41 40 27
Middle 50 17 64 23 34 12
High 30 10 33 13 16  6














Low 42 32 72 54 41 18
Middle 31 15 54 24 23  7
High 15  7 30  7 13  2














Low 52 10 52 12 26  6
Middle 29  4 23  6 21  3
High 17  2  7  3 15  2














Low 41 33 65 31 42 32
Middle 34 17 37 12 31 17
High 19  6 13  5 18  7
All 32 17 44 18 34 19
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vulnerable situation to begin with. Partial exceptions to this pattern 
are the US and Canada, but also Greece, Italy, Spain and the UK, 
where poverty rates are high even in the households of low-educated 
partnered mothers. Even though single motherhood poses a clear 
poverty risk in these countries, it is low education that is the strongest 
risk factor for poverty.
What if there were no educational differences in single motherhood 
prevalence?
Table 2.2 presents the results from the first standardisation exercise, in 
which I re-estimated single-mother and coupled-parent households’ 
poverty rates assuming no educational differences in single 
motherhood. As explained in the methods section, this means equal 
educational distributions among single and partnered mothers.
In almost all countries, the single-mother poverty gap would be 
smaller. Worth noting is that the poverty rate among coupled-parent 
households increases in Ireland and the US. This at-first-sight puzzling 
finding is due to the fact that fewer low-educated single-mother 
households would also mean more low-educated coupled-parent 
households.
Even if the single-mother poverty rates and the poverty gap would 
decrease in the hypothetical scenario of no educational gradients in 
single motherhood, this change is perhaps smaller than one would 
expect. Unsurprisingly, because of the small educational differences 
in single-mother prevalence, single-mother poverty – both in absolute 
terms and relative to partnered mothers – is next to unchanged in 
Italy. In Canada, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain, single-
mother households’ poverty rates would be reduced by around 5–10% 
in the absence of educational differences in single motherhood, and 
the difference in poverty rates between single-mother and coupled-
parent households would be reduced by around 10% (20% in Spain). 
In the other countries, single-mother households’ poverty rates would 
be 10–20% lower without single mothers’ overrepresentation among 
the low educated; likewise, the single-mother poverty gap would be 
15–25% lower. Educational gradients in single motherhood had the 
biggest effects on single-mother households’ poverty rates in Denmark 
and Luxembourg, where these poverty rates would be around 15–
20% lower. Relative to partnered mothers, the poverty gap would be 
reduced most in Luxembourg, Ireland and the UK (by one fourth). 
These are by no means small reductions, but they are not big enough 
that educational gradients in single motherhood would qualify as 
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the smoking gun that explains why single-mother households have 
elevated poverty rates.
To understand these effects, one can consider the Danish case, 
where the negative educational gradient in single motherhood is 
among the largest. There, the hypothetical elimination of educational 
differences in single motherhood would reduce the single-mother 
poverty rate from 27% to 23% – a reduction of 4 percentage points, 
or 16% (Table 2.2). Abolition of educational differences in single 
motherhood would mean that both single mothers and partnered 
mothers would have the same educational levels, namely those of all 
Danish mothers. This would mean that 15%, instead of the current 
25%, of single mothers would have low education. Likewise, the share 
of single mothers with high education would increase from 32% to 
43%, while the share of middle-educated single mothers would remain 
Table 2.2: Poverty rates (%), actual and standardised by assuming the single 
motherhood prevalence of highly educated mothers, and the difference 



















Denmark 27  5 23  5 –16 –10
Finland 26  7 23  7 –13 –19
Norway 34  5 30  5 –11 –14
Liberal
Australia 49 14 44 14 –10 –14
Canada 47 18 44 18  –6 –10
Ireland 32 12 28 13 –13 –26
UK 30 14 27 14 –12 –24
US 51 19 45 20 –11 –20
Continental
France 27  8 24  8 –13 –18
Germany 32  4 29  4  –9 –11
Luxembourg 35  8 29  8 –20 –25
Netherlands 20  3 19  3  –5  –7
Southern
Greece 32 16 31 16  –5  –9
Italy 43 17 42 17  –3  –4
Spain 33 19 31 19  –9 –20
The triple bind of single-parent families
44
very similar at 41–42%. One could think of this as moving 10% of 
single mothers from low education (and a poverty rate of 52%) to 
high education (with a poverty rate of 11%). This corresponds to the 
observed change in the single-mother poverty rate (10% × (52% – 
11%) ≈ 4 percentage points).
More generally, how much educational disparities in single 
motherhood contribute to single-mother households’ poverty rates 
depends on not only how large these educational disparities are but 
also the general educational level (that is, what share of single mothers 
have low, middle, or high education) and the educational differences 
in poverty rates. Because poverty rates are most sensitive to policy, 
we can consider their role more closely. In the above illustration, for 
instance, the observed change in the poverty rate would have been 
less if the educational differences in single mothers’ poverty rates had 
been smaller; in that scenario, moving the same 10% of single mothers 
from low to high education would have meant a smaller decrease in 
the single-mother poverty rate.
To further illustrate this point, I conducted a second set of 
standardisations in which single-mother and coupled-parent 
households’ poverty rates were estimated using the Dutch poverty 
rates instead of each country’s actual ones (from Table 2.1). The Dutch 
education–family structure specific poverty rates were used as the 
standard because single-mother households’ poverty rates were the 
lowest in the Netherlands. The underlying idea is to analyse whether 
each country’s educational differences in single motherhood would 
matter less for single-mother poverty, and the single-mother poverty 
gap, if each country’s poverty rates were lower than they actually are.
Findings from this standardisation are presented in Table 2.3. The 
first two columns show estimates of single-mother and coupled-parent 
households’ poverty rates if each country had their actual educational 
differences in single motherhood, but the Dutch poverty rates in 
each of the education–family structure cells. The third and fourth 
columns show estimates of these poverty rates additionally assuming 
that all educational groups had the single motherhood prevalence of 
the highly educated in that country. In other words, I performed the 
same standardisation exercise as in Table 2.2, but now using Dutch 
poverty rates instead of each country’s actual ones.
The first two columns of Table 2.3 show that although the educational 
gradients in single motherhood are quite different between these 
countries, the poverty rates would be cross-nationally very similar, and 
often very different (much lower) from the actual ones in each country. 
More crucially for the point made here, the hypothetical elimination 
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of educational differences in single-motherhood prevalence would in 
most countries have a much smaller effect on reducing single-mother 
households’ poverty rates than was the case when each country’s actual 
poverty rates were used instead. This illustrates that the importance of 
educational family structure differences for inequality is contingent on 
this inequality itself. What matters is not only how many households 
would be moved to family structures with smaller poverty risks but 
also how much smaller poverty risks these households would have as 
a result. This intuitively obvious point can be easily forgotten when 
considering how family structures and other compositional differences 
affect poverty rates.
Table 2.3: Poverty rates (%), standardised assuming the Dutch poverty rates 
in each education–family structure cell
Actual  
family structure
No family  














Netherlands 20 3 19 3 –5 –7
Nordic
Denmark 20 3 19 3 –6 –8
Finland 19 3 18 3 –6 –7
Norway 20 3 19 3 –6 –7
Continental
France 21 3 19 3 –5 –6
Germany 21 3 20 3 –4 –5
Luxembourg 22 4 21 4 –6 –8
Liberal
Australia 22 3 20 3 –8 –10
Canada 18 2 16 2 –11 –13
Ireland 21 3 19 3 –9 –11
UK 21 3 19 3 –6 –8
US 20 3 19 3 –5 –7
Southern
Greece 20 3 20 3 –3 –3
Italy 22 4 21 4 –1 –1
Spain 21 4 21 4 –4 –4
Note: Poverty rates assuming each country’s actual family structure, no family structure 
difference and the difference between the actual and standardised single-mother poverty 
rates and the poverty gap.
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Conclusions and discussion
The negative educational gradients of single motherhood have 
gained increasing interest among social scientists, not least because 
of the possibility that they can strengthen social inequalities between 
educational groups, by family structure and among adults and 
children alike. The discussion on these trends and their effects has 
been prominent in the US, where educational differences in single 
motherhood and family demography more generally have been 
widely documented (Manning & Brown, 2014; McLanahan, 2004; 
McLanahan & Jacobsen, 2015). Low educational attainment has 
also long been highlighted as a central feature of single mothers’ 
disadvantage in the UK (Gregg et al., 2009). Increasing evidence is 
building regarding similar trends in other European countries and Asia. 
Yet, despite the overall attention given to these trends and the concerns 
of their inequality-exacerbating effects, there has been little empirical 
analysis of how much, and under what conditions, educational 
cleavages in family demography strengthen social inequality.
In this study, I have presented up-to-date estimates of educational 
differences in single motherhood in 15 societies, and analysed their 
effects on single-mother poverty and the single-mother poverty gap 
(the difference between single-mother and coupled-parent households’ 
poverty rates). In line with accompanying work (for example, 
Härkönen 2017), the findings presented here support the view that 
educational differences in single motherhood are not a solely US 
phenomenon. With the exceptions of Greece and Italy (and to some 
extent Spain), single motherhood is today more common among low-
educated mothers than highly educated mothers, and mothers with 
middle levels of education are found in between. Indeed, it is striking 
how little cross-national variation there is in single motherhood 
among the highly educated, and single motherhood prevalence in 
this educational group is roughly between 10% and 15% (or below, 
in Southern Europe). Middle- and (especially) low-educated mothers 
are much more likely to be single, and the cross-national differences 
are much more prominent. In Ireland, single-motherhood prevalence 
among the low educated is as high as 40%, and between 20% and 
30% in many other societies. Indications of ‘diverging destinies’ 
(McLanahan, 2004) are thus a reality in many current societies.
Single motherhood combined with low education is poison for 
poverty risks, which reach above 70% in Canada and the US and 
between 40% and 50% in many countries (such as the Nordics) 
generally considered single-mother-friendly societies. The combination 
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of educational differences in single motherhood and very high poverty 
among low-educated single mothers leads to the expectation that 
educational differences in single motherhood have become a key 
explanation for understanding why single-mother-household poverty 
remains persistently high. To assess this question, I used a simple 
demographic standardisation to estimate poverty rates among single-
mother and coupled-parent households in the hypothetical scenario 
of no educational differences in single motherhood prevalence. 
As expected, the standardised and actual poverty rates were very 
similar in Greece and Italy, where single motherhood is not strongly 
patterned according to education. In all other countries, single-mother 
households’ poverty rates would be lower were single motherhood 
equally common in all educational groups. Yet the reductions in 
poverty rates are not generally mind-blowing, and generally range 
from 5% to 15%. Although the impact of the educational gradients 
in single motherhood should not be undermined, these reductions in 
single-mother poverty can be considered relatively modest considering 
the theoretical importance that socioeconomic differences in family 
demography have received in the literature (McLanahan & Percheski, 
2008; Putnam, 2015). These findings are in line with corresponding 
results on the relatively modest effects of educational differences in 
single motherhood for inequalities in child poverty risks (Härkönen, 
2017) and for intergenerational inequalities in educational attainment 
(Bernardi & Boertien, 2016).
When considering the sizes of the effects, one should pay attention 
to the factors that condition these effects. This has attracted less 
attention in the literature than the size of the educational differences 
in single motherhood prevalence (for an exception, see Cohen 2015). 
Here, I illustrated how educational differences in poverty rates among 
single mothers condition how much educational gradients in family 
structures matter for single-mother poverty and the single-mother 
poverty gap. When poverty rates and educational differences in poverty 
rates are higher, educational differences in family structure matter 
more than when educational differences in poverty rates are smaller. 
Negative educational gradients of single motherhood mean that single 
mothers are more likely to have low education than partnered mothers. 
The more single mothers’ low education increases their poverty risk, 
the more these educational differences matter for the poverty rates of 
single mothers as a group.
The educational divergence in family demography is happening 
in many countries. These trends can be hard to tackle with 
conventional policies. Those interested in the inequality consequences 
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of socioeconomically uneven family change should instead consider 
reducing poverty rates in all families. As a side effect, these reductions 
would also attenuate the inequality consequences of family change 
characterised by ‘diverging destinies’.
Note
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